

## Role of Media in Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad and Aksi Bela Islam 212

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### Abstrak

Gerakan Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad (TKNM) muncul ketika surat kabar Djawi Hisworo menerbitkan artikel yang menistakan Nabi Muhammad pada 1918 sedangkan gerakan Aksi Bela Islam 212 muncul ketika Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) menghadapi tuduhan penistaan agama tahun 2016 di Kepulauan Seribu dan menjadi viral di media sosial lalu diberitakan kembali oleh media massa. TKNM merupakan gerakan terbesar yang pernah terjadi di masa kolonial dan Aksi Bela Islam 212 merupakan gerakan terbesar di Indonesia pascakolonial. Kemunculan dua gerakan ini tidak lepas dari pengaruh media. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis peran media dalam gerakan TKNM dan Aksi Bela Islam 212 dengan menggunakan pendekatan komparatif serta metode sejarah yakni heuristik, verifikasi, interpretasi dan historiografi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa terdapat relasi kuasa dan media dalam kelahiran gerakan massa. Terdapat pula faktor politik dalam munculnya TKNM dan Aksi Bela Islam 212 dan gerakan ini dipelopori oleh dua tokoh berpengaruh yakni Tjokroaminoto dan Habib Rizieq.

**Kata kunci:** aksi bela islam 212, tknm, media.

### Abstract

*The Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad (TKNM) movement emerged following the publication of an article insulting the Prophet Muhammad by the Djawi Hisworo newspaper on 1918, while the Aksi Bela Islam 212 movement arose in response to blasphemy allegations against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in 2016. TKNM was the largest movement during the colonial period, and Aksi Bela Islam 212 became the largest post-colonial movement in Indonesia, both heavily influenced by media. This study examines the role of media in the TKNM and Aksi Bela Islam 212 movements using a comparative historical approach, involving heuristic, verification, interpretation, and historiography stages. Findings reveal a power-media relationship in the rise of mass movements, alongside political factors contributing to the mobilization of TKNM and Aksi Bela Islam 212, led respectively by prominent figures Tjokroaminoto and Habib Rizieq.*

**Keywords:** aksi bela islam 212, tknm, media.

### INTRODUCTION

The case of religious blasphemy brought against Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) in the Kepulauan Seribu on September 27, 2016, has added to the long list of religious blasphemy cases in Indonesia (Mantri 2022). Prior to the case involving Ahok, there were recorded 109 cases of religious blasphemy in Indonesia from 1965 to 2017, with nine cases during the New Order era, and the number ballooning

to one hundred cases during the Reformasi period (Setara Institute, January 15, 2018).

The regulations regarding religious blasphemy in Indonesia were established on January 27, 1965, by President Soekarno through Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia Number 1/PNPS Year 1965 concerning the Prevention of Abuse and/or Defamation of Religion. There were several cases of religious

Incidents of religious blasphemy have also occurred during the Dutch colonial period. It began when the newspaper *Djawi Hisworo* published an article in 1918 titled "Pertjakapan Marto dan Djojo." The article contained a controversial passage that stirred up the Dutch East Indies, which read:

*"Ah, like a pegoeron (a place of learning) is not a teacher, either telling stories or giving advice, foolishness now has its time. So, let it be now. As for the fatsal (feast), the hoendjoek food does not need to be wrapped in rice with a chicken, brendel. Because His Lordship Prophet Rasoel drinks A.V.H. tea and consumes opium, and sometimes likes klelet. It is necessary to find something that is not there. Even though there is a lot of rice, if there is no tea and opium, it will be useless at all... (Djawi Hisworo, January 11, 1918)."*

The writing then sparked anger among the Muslim community as it was considered blasphemous to Islam (Aditya 2011). The article in the *Djawi Hisworo* newspaper received strong reactions and condemnation from the Muslim community, leading H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto to organize a grand meeting in Surabaya. He invited one of the leaders of the Arab community, Haji bin Semit, to form a resistance movement called the Army of His Lordship Prophet Muhammad (Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad or TKNM) on February 6, 1918 (Arfan & Sumarno 2016).

On February 24, 1918, a synchronized campaign took place in 42 locations across Java and parts of Sumatra. It was reported that the campaign was attended by 150.000 people, with funds amounting to f10.000 (Shiraishi 1997). This can be interpreted as the movement seemingly succeeding in uniting the Muslim masses, particularly the Syarikat Islam (SI), which had recently experienced a decline (Wardhana 2019). TKNM itself was an affiliated movement with SI, and it managed to establish committees in almost all of Java except Semarang and Yogyakarta (Shiraishi 1997).

The movement was formed to defend the honor of Islam, the Prophet, and the Muslim community, while also demanding that Sunan and the Dutch East Indies government punish Martodharsono and Djodjodikoro (Shiraishi 1997). It is noteworthy that TKNM was the largest movement to defend the honor of Islam during the colonial period, originating from the religious blasphemy published in the *Djawi Hisworo* newspaper.

During the Reform Era, cases of blasphemy experienced an increasing trend from year to year (Akbar 2019). However, the case of religious blasphemy imposed on Ahok on September 27, 2016, in the Kepulauan Seribu received widespread condemnation from the public. Many believed that Ahok was not fit to interpret the Quran and lacked the

capacity to do so (kompas.com, December 14, 2016; Maghfirah 2018).

On November 4, 2016, a group of demonstrators calling themselves “Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa Ulama-MUI” (The National Movement of Fatwa-Guardians of the Indonesian Ulema Council) or GNPf-MUI staged a peaceful protest (tempo.co, November 5, 2016). The movement was initiated by Bachtiar Nasir, Habib Rizieq Shihab, Misbahul Anam, and several other figures (republika.co, November 5, 2016).

On December 2, 2016, Aksi Bela Islam 212 (*the Islamic Defenders Front 212*), commonly known as the 212 Movement, reached the peak of its popularity with the presence of various national figures (bbc.com, December 2, 2016). There were conflicting opinions on the number of participants in the demonstration, ranging from hundreds of thousands to millions (republika.co, December 4, 2016). However, there is no exact figure regarding the number of participants, but it is widely agreed that the demonstration was the largest in Indonesian history, especially when conducting a collective Friday prayer in one location (bbc.com, December 5, 2016).

TKNM and the Aksi Bela Islam 212 are events that emerged in different historical contexts but share some similar historical patterns, making them intriguing topics for research. While social

movements are frequently explored in historical research, this study specifically focuses on the role of the media. The research objective is to investigate: How does the media influence the TKNM Movement and the Aksi Bela Islam 212, enabling the mobilization of mass participation during that period? Through a concentrated analysis of media influence, this research aims to provide insights into the critical question of how media shapes the dynamics and mobilization of masses in both movements at that time. A nuanced understanding of media influence is anticipated to offer valuable perspectives on the historical relationship between media and social movements, contributing to the scholarly discourse on Indonesian history.

## METHODS

This research employs the historical method consisting of four stages: 1) heuristic, involving the collection of primary and secondary data. Collected data includes various colonial-era newspapers around 1917-1918 such as Djawi Hisworo, Oetoesan Hindia, contemporary newspapers published both physically and digitally such as Tempo, Kompas, Republika, BBC Indonesia, CNN Indonesia, and social media as an alternative medium within the mainstream media hegemony. 2) source criticism, a stage to verify the originality of sources, ensuring their suitability for research

purposes. 3) interpretation, analyzing all verified sources and providing descriptive analysis to yield what is referred to as 4) historiography - the outcome of historical research following the methodological stages of the historical discipline.

In this article, the author employs the Agenda-Setting Theory. This theory originates from the phenomenon observed in 1972 during the U.S. presidential campaign, concluding that mass media has the ability to transfer important issues from the news agenda (press) to the public agenda. News consumers perceive as important whatever the media deems significant. In other words, the agenda-setting theory represents a mass communication effect that influences society and culture. In their research, Maxwell E. Combs and Donald Shaw successfully identified the connection between news and news consumers, particularly regarding the voters in the U.S. presidential election at that time (Ritonga 2018).

The Agenda-Setting Theory focuses on the role of mass media in influencing public attention towards specific issues. This theory posits that mass media not only informs the public about what to think but also guides them on what to think about (McCombs & Shaw 1972).

Essentially, the Agenda-Setting Theory argues that mass media has the ability to set the agenda or compose a list of issues that capture public attention.

This is achieved by selecting, highlighting, and repeatedly covering specific issues. As a result, the public tends to pay more attention to issues that frequently appear in the media and deems them as important (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 76).

Thus, the utilization of the theory in this research is expected to provide an understanding of how the media can intervene in reporting and influence the public's response to the information conveyed by the media. In the Agenda-Setting Theory, two main concepts exist: (1) Primary Agenda Setting (First-Level Agenda Setting): This refers to the mass media's ability to determine the issues that should be of public concern, meaning the media selects which issues to report. (2) Secondary Agenda Setting (Second-Level Agenda Setting): This pertains to the media's ability to influence how the public perceives and understands the issues that have been chosen by the media (McCombs & Shaw 1972).

This section will be preceded by a diagram to facilitate a better understanding of the agenda-setting scheme in the media's reporting and how the public responds to it Agenda Setting Scheme.

Owners or media proprietors often intervene in the supposed independence of the press, facing both internal and external interference. Owners always have interests in two aspects: 1) business interests and 2) economic interests. These

two interests impact the media's sustainability as a company. A media company that has entered the agenda-setting scheme will be influenced by the owner, ensuring that the news broadcast to the audience is "aligned" by both the media workers and the owner. Consequently, in this scheme, the press no longer operates independently but rather in alignment with the interests of the media company.

In the reporting of the *Djawi Hisworo* newspaper, initially deemed as containing religious blasphemy on January 11, 1918, it did not evoke a widespread public response because it was considered not blasphemous. *Djawi Hisworo* was also affiliated with Budi Utomo, an organization with a nationalist-ethnocentric ideology (Latief 2005), as opposed to a nationalist-theological stance, such as that of Syarikat Islam. Consequently, the reporting was not considered sensational news within their internal circles.

However, the political tide began to shift when Oetoesan Hindia, a newspaper under the auspices of Syarikat Islam, raised this issue one month after the initial reporting. Upon further investigation, there was no coverage of the article published by *Djawi Hisworo* dated January 11, 1918, until the end of January when Oetoesan Hindia brought up the issue (Oetoesan Hindia, January 31, 1918).

The issue is suspected to have been manipulated by Syarikat Islam because, during that period, the Syarikat Islam movement experienced stagnation (Wardhana 2019). Additionally, there was dualism within Syarikat Islam, especially in Semarang under the leadership of Haji Misbach and Semaoen, later known as the Red Syarikat Islam (Winarni & Widuatie 2015), which later transformed into the Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI (Ahmad & Mahasta 2020). After Oetoesan Hindia brought up the issue, it quickly became a national concern (Oetoesan Hindia, January 31, 1918). At that time, Syarikat Islam was the largest nationalist Muslim movement organization in the colonial era, with numerous branches in the Dutch East Indies (Fajar 2021). Therefore, it is not surprising that the distribution and dissemination of this news became widespread.

The coverage presented by Oetoesan Hindia garnered widespread attention, leading to strong condemnation of *Djawi Hisworo* by the Muslim community. Consequently, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto invited one of the leaders of the Arab community, Haji bin Semit (Malik 2019), to establish a resistance movement named Tentara Kandjeng Nabi Muhammad (TKNM) on February 6, 1918, in Surabaya (Arfan & Sumarno 2016).

This movement operated on a massive scale, organizing a synchronized campaign on February 24, 1918,

conducted in 42 locations across Java and parts of Sumatra. The campaign reportedly attracted 150.000 participants and raised funds amounting to f10.000 (Shiraishi 1997). This suggests that the movement seemingly succeeded in unifying the Muslim masses, particularly those associated with Syarikat Islam (SI), which was experiencing stagnation (Wardhana 2019). TKNM itself was affiliated with SI, successfully establishing committees in almost all of Java except Semarang and Yogyakarta (Shiraishi 1997). The movement was formed to defend the honor of Islam, the Prophet, and the Muslim community, simultaneously demanding that Sunan and the Dutch East Indies government punish Martodharsono and Djojodikoro (Shiraishi 1997).

This movement was absent in two cities, namely Semarang and Yogyakarta, due to the influence of the Red Syarikat Islam in Semarang and Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta. Muhammadiyah considered their organization sufficient to address the issue of religious blasphemy, hence the absence of the movement in these cities (Arfan & Sumarno 2016).

After the Volksraad conducted elections, and Tjokroaminoto was elected as one of its members, TKNM continued its activities. However, the movement experienced stagnation and tended to decline, leading to its dissolution in October 1919 (Arfan & Sumarno 2016).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

### **Aksi Bela Islam 212: Ahok in the Demonstration**

During Aksi Bela Islam 212, Ahok's remark led to massive demonstrations in 2016 to 2017, making the movement known as Aksi Bela Islam 212 the largest action in Indonesian history, akin to when TKNM became the largest movement in the colonial era in 1918.

The difference lies in the fact that the TKNM movement began with a newspaper, whereas Aksi Bela Islam 212 started when Buni Yani, a journalist, reposted a video of Ahok in the Kepulauan Seribu on his Facebook social media page. This quickly led to mass turmoil. In contrast to the TKNM case, which had a gap of less than a month between the occurrence of religious blasphemy and the initiation of the movement, the reposted video by Buni Yani took only a few days post-incident to become viral and a widespread topic of discussion (Priliantini & Damayanti 2018).

The following excerpt contains Ahok's statement, which is considered blasphemous to Islam.

*"So, let's take care of each other. So, ladies and gentlemen, don't worry, this election is being advanced. So, even if I am not elected, ladies and gentlemen, my term will end in October 2017. So, if we run this program well, ladies and gentlemen, you can still reap the benefits with me even if I am not elected as governor. So, I want to share*

*this story to boost your spirits. So, don't think, 'Ah, if he's not elected, the program will be discontinued.' No, I'll be here until October 2017. So, don't trust people. It's possible that in your hearts, you can't vote for me because you've been deceived using Surah Al-Maidah 51, and so on (people laugh). It's your right. So, if you feel you can't vote for me because you're afraid of going to hell for being fooled, it's okay, because this is a personal choice for you. The program will continue. So, you don't have to feel uncomfortable. In your conscience, if you can't vote for Ahok, if you don't like Ahok, it's okay. But the program, if I accept it, I'll feel uncomfortable towards him. If you feel uncomfortable, you might slowly die from a stroke. (satuharapan.com, December 13, 2016)"*

The Agenda-Setting scheme seems to not apply to anti-mainstream media such as social media; however, the Agenda-Setting scheme plays a role in mainstream media companies. Media becomes polarized in its practices; there are media outlets that tend to be biased in supporting Aksi Bela Islam 212 movement, such as tvOne, and biased in countering the movement, such as Metro TV.

A concrete proof is when the coverage team from Metro TV was denied access in the midst of Aksi Bela Islam 212, and the culmination was when Metro TV was reported to the Press Council for not broadcasting Aksi Bela Islam 212 in 2017 (remotivi.or.id, January 20, 2019). This

can be analyzed because the owner of Metro TV is Surya Paloh, the Chairman of the Nasdem Party, who supported Ahok's candidacy in the past 2017 gubernatorial election.

On the other hand, tvOne, considered the main competitor of Metro TV in terms of business, took over that position by providing comprehensive coverage of Aksi Bela Islam 212 when Metro TV refused to broadcast it. tvOne and Metro TV seemed to draw a clear line in their reporting, starting from the 2014 Presidential Election (Kurniawan 2019) and continuing with Aksi Bela Islam 212. In fact, the duration presented by tvOne during Aksi Bela Islam 212 was more extensive than the top ten highest-rated television media in Indonesia (Fachrudin 2021).

Surya Paloh and Nasdem, of course, became the accused party, with Metro TV being questioned on how it no longer upholds journalistic ethics and imposes 'restrictions' on press freedom, as regulated by the Republic of Indonesia Law Number 40 of 1999 concerning the Press.

### **Gerakan Aksi Bela Islam 212 and TKNM: A Comparative**

Aksi Bela Islam 212 movement is always identified with the charismatic image of Habib Rizieq Shihab in the eyes of its supporters, and his followers label him as the Grand Imam in Aksi Bela Islam 212.

The charismatic image of Habib Rizieq Shihab in managing Aksi Bela Islam 212 movement is similar to Tjokroaminoto's role in managing the TKNM.

The difference lies in Tjokroaminoto having media with a large consumer base, whereas Habib Rizieq does not. Habib Rizieq does indeed own a television media called Front TV under the auspices of Aksi Bela Islam 212 (FPI), which he leads. However, this media is only a mainstream outlet that contains and focuses on activities related to the FPI.

Another finding indicating the difference is when TKNM and Aksi Bela Islam 212 are both closely associated with the political atmosphere, but what sets them apart is that Tjokroaminoto, through his media, is directly involved in political contestation. In contrast, during Aksi Bela Islam 212, it was close to the 2017 Gubernatorial Election, and mainstream media such as tvOne and Metro TV played a significant role, followed by other media outlets like Republika, which, in their reporting, tendentiously portrayed a positive image of Aksi Bela Islam 212. Meanwhile, media outlets like BBC Indonesia seemingly adopted skepticism and were considered part of the opposition, along with Kompas, which was then acronymized as the "*Komando Pastur (Pastor Command)*" or Kompas, a term that was often mischievously coined (Saputra 2020)

The issue of religious blasphemy in 1918, which gave rise to TKNM, coincided with the political atmosphere when the colonial government was about to form the membership of the Volksraad, so Tjokroaminoto was considered to seize a political momentum to elevate his name at that time (Fajar 2021). In contrast, the birth of Aksi Bela Islam 212 was closely related to the gubernatorial election (Pilgub) of DKI Jakarta in 2017, which resulted in the defeat of Ahok as the incumbent (Wiandi 2019)

The religious blasphemy case carried out by *Djawi Hisworo* resulted in the polarization of society due to media coverage. Within the SI itself, the SI Merah group based in Surakarta rejected the presence of TKNM, even though they shared the same view as Tjokroaminoto that *Djawi Hisworo* committed religious blasphemy (Sinar Djawa 1918). In the case of Ahok's religious blasphemy, a similar pattern was found, namely the polarization of society and mass media. An example of media polarization is when tvOne reported on Aksi Bela Islam 212, but Metro TV ignored the news (remotivi.or.id January 20, 2019)

This phenomenon can be analyzed as the intervention of media owners in news framing. Oetoesan Hindia raised the title of the religious blasphemy case, which was considered advantageous for Tjokroaminoto as a person (Fajar 2021), simultaneously strengthening the

solidarity of SI, which later tended to experience stagnation (Fajar 2021). In contrast, Metro TV's neglect of Aksi Bela Islam 212 indicates political bias on the part of Surya Paloh, as the party he leads, NasDem, supported Ahok as a candidate for the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election (Nazif 2022)

The fundamental difference lies in the fact that *Djawi Hisworo's* religious blasphemy case was first reported by mass media, whereas the case of religious blasphemy against Ahok was initially reported by Buni Yani on his social media platform. The excerpt of Ahok's statement uploaded by Buni Yani became news that was subsequently reported by mass media, causing public uproar (bbc.com 2016) tvOne, a business competitor of Metro TV (Kurniawan 2019), took an antithetical stance against Metro TV by extensively covering Aksi Bela Islam 212 at the same time when Metro TV tended to avoid any coverage related to Ahok in that case and was labeled as a television channel that was perceived as anti-Islam (bbc.com 2016).

The conclusion of these movements occurred when their respective goals were achieved. TKNM began to experience a decline when H.O.S Tjokroaminoto joined the Volksraad, and the direction of the movement declined (Arfan & Sumarno 2016), while Aksi Bela Islam 212 seemed to lose significant momentum when Ahok was convicted and imprisoned (asumsi.co

2021). Although Aksi Bela Islam 212 was not disbanded like TKNM, the gathered masses at each reunion event were not as numerous as in the early years of the movement. It can be said that there are no political factors or interests causing Aksi Bela Islam 212 to become stagnant and tend to decline.

## CONCLUSION

From the findings above, it can be concluded that the agenda-setting scheme had already occurred long before the theory was formulated in 1972. The agenda-setting scheme is inseparable from political and business factors. Tjokroaminoto used his media to gain electability in the issue of religious blasphemy committed by *Djawi Hisworo*, forming TKNM, and seizing the political momentum during the election of Volksraad members. On the other hand, Habib Rizieq Shihab utilized the same issue, along with other figures, to establish the Aksi Bela Islam 212 movement, which was perceived as having an interest in undermining Ahok's leadership in the 2017 Gubernatorial Election. The intervention of Surya Paloh, as the Chairman of Nasdem, became apparent when Metro TV did not broadcast the action in 2017 because Nasdem was part of the coalition supporting Ahok's victory.

Political interests influence the mobilization of mass action within a

movement. Both TKNM and "Aksi Bela Islam 212" have proven capable of attracting significant mass mobilization when political issues are juxtaposed with religious issues in a political year. Media plays a significant role in influencing public opinion. Additionally, the leadership factor of H.O.S Tjokroaminoto has a significant impact on the formation of TKNM, as does the leadership factor of Habib Rizieq in "Aksi Bela Islam 212." TKNM eventually experienced a decline in the number of participants after Tjokroaminoto was elected as a member of Volksraad, while Aksi Bela Islam 212 no longer had a structured direction of struggle when Ahok failed to become the Governor of Jakarta and was imprisoned.

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