

Lieutenant II Muradi and the Guerrilla Struggle Against the Dutch: War Tactics in Military Aggression II in Kerinci (1948-1949)

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Abstrak

Setelah penjajahan Jepang berakhir di Indonesia, Belanda berkeinginan kembali menjajah Indonesia dengan bantuan Sekutu. Indonesia menentang keras rencana Belanda tersebut, sehingga terjadilah perlawanan yang hebat dari rakyat Indonesia dan Belanda mulai melakukan Agresi Militer I dan II di berbagai daerah, termasuk Kerinci. Pada Agresi Militer Belanda II di Kerinci, Letnan II Muradi menjadi sosok yang sangat penting karena memimpin dan mengatur strategi perang gerilya melawan Belanda. Fokus utama penelitian ini adalah melihat peran Letnan II Muradi dan taktik perang yang digunakan bersama pasukannya dalam menghadapi kekuatan militer Belanda yang lebih superior. Metode yang digunakan dalam tulisan ini adalah metode sejarah. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Letnan II Muradi, yang berasal dari Desa Koto Tuo, Kabupaten Kerinci, menyelesaikan pendidikannya di SR CVO dan Sekolah Tinggi Keguruan di Bengkulu, lalu menjadi guru di Bengkulu. Selama pendudukan Jepang, ia diangkat menjadi *Gyugun*, atau tentara pembantu Jepang, dengan pangkat Sersan Mayor. Dalam Agresi Militer Belanda II, ia memimpin perang menggunakan taktik gerilya, taktik bumi hangus, dan deteksi kesiapan melawan Belanda. Kontribusinya dalam perjuangan di Kerinci sangat dihormati, terbukti dengan pendirian monumen perjuangannya di Kota Sungai Penuh, Kerinci, dan pemberian namanya sebagai nama jalan protokol di Kabupaten Kerinci.

Kata kunci: letnan II muradi, gerilya, agresi militer II, kerinci.

Abstract

After the end of Japanese colonialism in Indonesia, the Dutch wanted to re-colonize Indonesia with the help of the Allies. Indonesia strongly opposed the Dutch plan, so there was great resistance from the Indonesian people and the Dutch began to carry out Military Aggression I and II in various regions, including Kerinci. In the Dutch Military Aggression in Kerinci, Lieutenant II Muradi became a very important figure because he led and organized the guerrilla war strategy against the Dutch. The main focus of this research is to look at the role of Lieutenant II Muradi and the war tactics used with his troops in the face of superior Dutch military strength. The method used in this paper is the historical method. The results show that lieutenant II Muradi, who came from Koto Tuo Village, Kerinci Regency, completed his education at the SR CVO and the Vocational College in Bengkulu, then became a teacher in Bengkulu. During the Japanese occupation, he was appointed to the Gyugun, or Japanese auxiliary army, with the rank of Sergeant Major. In Dutch Military Aggression II, he led the war using guerrilla tactics, scorched earth tactics, and readiness detection against the Dutch. His contribution to the struggle in Kerinci is highly respected, as evidenced by the establishment of a monument to his struggle in Sungai Penuh City, Kerinci, and the naming of a protocol road in Kerinci Regency.

Keywords: lieutenant II muradi, guerrilla, military aggression II, kerinci.

INTRODUCTION

On August 15, 1945, after Japan was defeated and left its territory including Indonesia, the Dutch tried to re-colonize

Indonesia with the help of the Allies. This was strongly opposed by the Indonesian people who wanted to maintain independence (Arman, 2015). To

strengthen Indonesia's position, the government chose diplomacy as the main strategy, hoping to gain international support as it was considered the most effective and appropriate step in the situation (Sudiyo, 2002). However, the Linggarjati and Renville agreements, which were more favorable to the Netherlands, showed that diplomacy had not been fully successful. The Netherlands still wanted to control Indonesia, while Indonesia was determined to maintain its independence (Lubis, 2004). The arrival and occupation of the Netherlands after Indonesian independence reflected a clash of worldviews. Indonesia demanded full independence, while the Netherlands sought to maintain control for its colonial, economic and political interests, despite international pressure in favour of independence (McMahon, 2022).

The Dutch actions to maintain control over its former colony in Indonesia were widely regarded as a form of international aggression, which not only violated the sovereignty of a nation struggling for independence, but also contradicted the principles of international law that the newly formed United Nations Organisation (UNO) had begun to uphold after World War II. In this context, the Netherlands was seen as going against the global tide that increasingly recognises the right of nations to self-determination, and ignoring UN

resolutions calling for a peaceful resolution of the conflict (Evatt, 2013).

At the Linggarjati Agreement in West Java, the head of the Indonesian delegation was Sutan Sjahrir and the Dutch delegation was Prof. Schermerhorn. The agreement includes: The Netherlands recognized *de facto* the territory of Indonesia consisting of Java, Sumatra, and Madura; The Netherlands must leave the territory of Indonesia no later than January 1, 1949; and both parties agreed to form the Republic of Indonesia Union (RIS) which includes Indonesia, Kalimantan, and the Great East before January 1, 1949 (Agung, 1983).

While the Linggarjati Agreement was still in progress, the Dutch made a surprise attack on Indonesia. These attacks did not only occur in Java but also extended to areas outside Java. The Dutch considered the Republic of Indonesia to have failed to fulfill the criteria set out in the Linggarjati Agreement. This military action was part of Dutch Military Aggression I, which began on July 21, 1947, with the occupation of a number of important cities across Indonesia (Arman, 2015).

During the First Military Aggression, the people of Kerinci were not directly involved in the fight against Dutch troops due to the Status Quo Linggarjati line that separated Kerinci from Padang and direct contact with the Dutch. However, some Kerinci youth fought in the Padang region,

facing the Dutch directly. Meanwhile, the Kerinci region served as a vital back line, with the main task of providing and coordinating the delivery of foodstuffs to support the fighters on the front lines (Dasiba et al., 2004).

When the Military Aggression II began, Major Alwi St. Marajo had just been appointed commander of the Second Regiment in Sungai Penuh, Kerinci. On December 19, 1948, Major Alwi and a group of 14 vehicles and a GATI company set off for Sungai Penuh, carrying equipment such as transmitters and ammunition. The arduous journey took five days, and they arrived on December 27, 1948. Upon arrival, the 2nd Regiment Commander immediately devised a general defense plan to deal with potential Dutch attacks (Hardi et al., 2019).

The Dutch successfully entered the Kerinci region on April 27, 1949, they entered from the direction of Tapan towards Sungai Penuh City, and occupied Sungai Penuh City, but the situation of Sungai Penuh City at that time had been vacated by the fighters, soldiers and the community, they had anticipated the arrival of the Dutch so before the Dutch came the fighters had moved, they fled to the downstream area (south), and the homecoming area (north), all under the command and order of Captain Marajisan Yunus, Lieutenant II Muradi and Alamsyah (Saidi, 2023).

Before the Japanese occupied Indonesia, Lieutenant II Muradi worked as a teacher at the Kepahiang agricultural teachers' school in Curup, Bengkulu. In 1943, he joined the Gyu-gun with the rank of sergeant major. After the Japanese surrender, Lieutenant II Muradi joined the Kerinci youth and together with Major A. Talib fought the Dutch. In the formation of the BKR/TKR in Kerinci, Lieutenant II Muradi acted as an officer, working together with Major A. Thalib in establishing the Second Regiment Battalion of the IX Banteng Division (Dasiba et al., 2004).

During the Military Aggression II, Lieutenant II Muradi devised strategies to fight the Dutch, often moving according to the location of enemy attacks. He directed the community to use guerrilla warfare tactics, "attack and disappear." This tactic made it difficult for the Dutch and gave Lieutenant II Muradi a reputation as a magician who could disappear in the blink of an eye, leaving the Dutch in disarray against Kerinci fighters (Saidi, 2023).

Lieutenant II Muradi is a figure that the people of Kerinci are proud of. This pride is expressed in a work of art, a folk song entitled "Kerinci Hero". In one of its lyrics, the song describes the courage and dedication of Lieutenant II Muradi in protecting and advancing the people of Kerinci.

“Lieutenant II Muradi Gagah Berani, Pahlawan Berasal Tanah Belui, Bia Lah Mati, Tegak Nyo Rakyat Tanah Kurinci”. Lieutenant II Muradi played a very important role during the Military Aggression, which earned him the respect of the community. One proof of this respect can be seen from the name of one of the protocol roads in Sungai Penuh City that uses his name. Although there is no scientific work that explores the role of Lieutenant II Muradi, the pride of the Kerinci community towards him shows that he is a figure of struggle that deserves further research in a paper entitled “Lieutenant II Muradi and the Guerrilla Struggle Against the Dutch: War Tactics in Military Aggression II in Kerinci (1948-1949)”.

METHOD

The method used in this research is the historical research method, which consists of four stages. The first stage is heuristic, which is the process of collecting relevant sources. At this stage, researchers collect various sources, both written, such as documents, archives and books, and oral, such as interviews or folklore. Historical relics can also be collected as sources. The aim of this stage is to provide sufficient data before proceeding to the next stage (Sjamsudin, 2012).

Heuristics involved tracing sources in Kerinci at Lieutenant II Muradi's wife's family home in Belui village, the Kerinci

veterans office in Sungai Penuh, and the Kerinci regional library in Semurup. At Lieutenant II Muradi's wife's family home, researchers found his diaries from 1947-1949, photos from the 1949 struggle, and various military documents. At the Kerinci veterans office, researchers discovered photos of Lieutenant II Muradi. Lastly, at the house of the late Mr. Dasiba, a friend of Lieutenant II Muradi, researchers found additional photos from the 1949 struggle period. For oral sources, the researchers interviewed Mr. Saidi and Mr. Amir Syarif, both veterans in Siulak Mukai. Mr. Saidi revealed his struggle in Siulak Gedang and Talang Tentak in 1949, as well as receiving orders from Lieutenant II Muradi. Mr. Amir Syarif discussed his participation with Lieutenant II Muradi against military aggression in the same year, as well as the strategies used in the battle at Siulak Gedang.

To find sources and informants, a snowball sampling technique was used, which is a way of finding new informants through recommendations from informants who have already been interviewed. This technique is very useful when researchers do not know who can be a good source of information for their research (Christine & Holloway, 2008).

Snowball sampling is said to be a method where the number of informants and sources increases over time, similar to a snowball that gets bigger as it rolls. This happens because each informant or source

interviewed recommends others, so that from the initial few informants, the number becomes more and more thanks to referrals from those who have been interviewed before (Ismail, 2018).

Secondary sources in this research include various types of reading materials such as books, articles, newspapers, and also sources from the internet. The secondary sources in this research are books on the history of the struggle of the Kerinci people 1945-1949, the biography of H.A Thalib, and the book on the struggle of the Kerinci people 1945-1949.

The second step is source criticism. Researchers use internal criticism to assess credibility and external criticism for source validity (Madjid M.D, 2014). The main sources are Lieutenant II Muradi's diary, the book History of Kerinci People's Struggle, and interviews with historical actors. External criticism involves examining the materials, ink, and background information of the documents to ensure authenticity (Kuntowijoyo, 2013). The researcher ensured the appropriateness of the time context and evaluated the reliability of the written and oral sources through thorough verification in the field (Lilik, 2014).

The next stage in the historical method is to interpret the sources. Interpretation must be done very carefully to minimize the subjectivity of the researcher. This process considers the validity of the data that has been

analyzed through previous source criticism. The final stage is historiography, which is the compilation of the historical story itself.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Life History of Lieutenant II Muradi



Picture 1. Lieutenant II Muradi
Source: Lieutenant II Muradi's wife's family archive

Lieutenant II Muradi is a man who was born in a place in Kerinci called Koto Tuo, which is also often referred to as the Kewalian Depati VII, located in the area far above, namely Kerinci Hulu. His birth date was January 27 in 1927. His parents were H. Manan and Seneng Iman. Lieutenant II Muradi himself is the first of three children, they are Lieutenant II Muradi as the first child, Tasiah as the second child and Bustanuddin as the third child (Nuryati, 2023).

After becoming a lieutenant, Lieutenant II Muradi fell in love with Sri Fatimah from Belui Village and married in 1944. During their five years of marriage, they were not blessed with children,

possibly because they were often separated and Lieutenant II Muradi rarely came home. After three months of Dutch presence in Kerinci, Sri Fatimah became pregnant. At eight months pregnant, Dutch soldiers looted the house where they were staying in Sungai Medang village and arrested Sri Fatimah at 1pm on Tuesday, August 9, 1949.

Lieutenant II Muradi notes that Sri Fatimah was blessed with two children whom they loved dearly. Their first child was named Dwiwarni, which is associated with the Indonesian national flag, and the second child was named Wiryadi Lieutenant II Muradi. Both children were born in the Dutch prison camp in Siulak Deras village, as Fatimah was arrested when she was heavily pregnant. In a diary entry dated August 9, 1949, Lieutenant II Muradi recorded the events, including the birth of their children in prison.



Picture 2. Lieutenant II Muradi's Diary August 9, September 2, September 18, 1949.

Source: Ibid

- Agustus 1949: Mendapat Kabar Atas Kelahiran Anak Saya Dia Dinamakan Dwiwarni/Indang
- 2/9/1949. Hari Kelahirannya Hari Jum'at Pukul 10 Tengah Hari Di Kamp Belanda Siulak Deras
- 18 September 1949 Sri Bebas Dari Tahanan Belanda Di Siulak Deras (Selama 8-8-1949 -18-09-1949) (Lieutenant II Muradi, 1949a)

Sri Fatimah was released from Dutch military custody after her baby was 17 days old, possibly for humanitarian reasons. While out of detention, the Dutch kept an eye on them, hoping that Lieutenant II Muradi would emerge from the forest to see his baby, but he did not, realizing the risk of being arrested. Through clever tactics, Lieutenant II Muradi only met his son when the situation was safe (Nuryati, 2023). Dutch cruelty can be seen in the treatment of Sri Fatimah, who had to give birth in prison. Despite being threatened to surrender, lieutenant II Muradi showed his patriotism by risking everything for the sake of the nation, including his own life.

Studying In Kerinci, Padang, And Bengkulu

In the 1930s, Kerinci's young people began to show a desire to continue their education. After completing SR Sungai Penuh, they had to leave their hometown because there was no secondary school there. A reasonable option was to continue their education in West Sumatra, such as Padang or Bukittinggi, as they were closer than Jambi.

Sungai Penuh is about 210 kilometers away from Padang, while Jambi is 418 kilometers away. Until the 1920s, the journey from Kerinci to West Sumatra could be taken by two routes: overland via Tapan for 70 km and along the South Coast to Padang, or by sea via Muara Sakai in Indrapura and by boat to Muaro Padang or Teluk Bayur, which took 3-4 days on foot (Ramli & Ayu, n.d.).

Lieutenant II Muradi began his formal education at Sekolah Rakyat (SR) in Sungai Penuh, Kerinci, for six years. After completing his primary education, he went on to the CVO (Cursus Opleiding voor Volks Onderwijzer) program in Padang, which was designed for teacher education. Lieutenant II Muradi then continued his education at HIK, an agricultural teacher school in Kepahiang Curup, Bengkulu, which provided training to become educators in agriculture. After completing his education at HIK, Lieutenant II Muradi began his professional career as a young clerk at the agricultural inspection in Kerinci Indrapura. Throughout his educational period and early career, Lieutenant II Muradi demonstrated a strong dedication to self-development and contributions to the education and agriculture sectors.

Entering Gyu-Gun To Become A Lieutenant II

In mid-1943, Japan opened military training for youth in Sumatra with the aim

of strengthening the defense of the island of Sumatra which was threatened by Allied attacks. This training was implemented through the formation of the Gyu-gun, a voluntary army unit drawn from the indigenous population, led by Khatib Sulaiman (Putri, 2021). Registration and announcements for the training were widespread, including in Kerinci, and were attended by many young men with different qualifications, both for officer and non-commissioned officer candidates.

Lieutenant II Muradi himself joined the Gyu-gun in 1943 with the rank of Sergeant Major, utilizing his education as a teacher. He belonged to the second generation of Gyu-gun members and underwent training under Major A. Talib in Padang. After the Japanese surrender, Lieutenant II Muradi was active in the struggle against the invaders, involved in the formation of the BKR and later TKR in Kerinci. His contribution and dedication in various battles and military operations resulted in Lieutenant II Muradi being promoted to Lieutenant, cementing his role in the history of Indonesia's struggle for independence (Tarikat, 2023).


The Struggle Strategy of lieutenant II Muradi In Facing The Dutch Military Aggression

Detecting The Dutch Arrival In Kerinci

Lieutenant II Muradi used a radio communication strategy with his colleagues in Pesisir Selatan to detect the

Dutch arrival in Kerinci, utilizing his network from his school days in Padang and Bengkulu (Kambaruddin, 2023). After the signing of the Renville Agreement and the outbreak of Military Aggression II, the Dutch attempted to regain control of Indonesian territory, including West Sumatra. They began their invasion by bombarding Padang and moving towards Kerinci. However, Kerinci's strategic geography and the persistent resistance of the local population made the region difficult to access and one of the last areas to be captured by the Dutch. Kerinci's resistance showed the resilience and determination of its people in defending the sovereignty of their territory (Saidi, 2023).

The Dutch entered Kerinci on April 24, 1949, via Painan, Air Haji, Balai Tuesday, Indrapura, Muaro Sakai, Tapan, and finally Kerinci. The journey was difficult due to resistance in every area. Upon arrival in Kerinci, the first area they reached was Koto Limau Sering near Sungai Penuh. Major St. Marajo, the military leader of Sungai Penuh, had known of the Dutch arrival. The Dutch used the houses in Rawang as temporary camps. Knowing the Dutch plan, the entire town of Sungai Penuh was emptied in a scorched earth action, and important equipment was moved to Lempur (Dasiba et al., 2004).




Picture 3. Lieutenant II Muradi's notes on the beginning of Dutch Military Aggression II until the Dutch entered Kerinci.
Source: Ibid

In this note Lieutenant II Muradi records the chronology of the military aggression II by the Dutch against Indonesia, starting on December 18, 1948 when the Dutch began their attack at five in the morning. On April 19, 1949, Dutch troops attacked southward towards Painan and Kerinci, with eight aircraft flying over the skies of Kerinci. On April 20, 1949, Dutch troops entered Muaro Sakai and Indrapura, facing fierce resistance from the local people. Then, on April 21, 1949, the Dutch moved to Tapan, fought at Nilau and continued to Sako, despite fierce resistance from the people. After a series of battles, they returned to Tapan and continued the attack to Kerinci, demonstrating the persistence of local resistance as well as

the Dutch military strategy in trying to control strategic territory in Indonesia (Lieutenant II Muradi, 1949b).

Designing Resistance to The Dutch At The Beginning of Military Aggression In Kerinci

After detecting the arrival of the Dutch, before the Dutch arrived in Kerinci, a strategy called the "scorched earth strategy" was designed. This strategy aimed to ensure that the Dutch troops did not gain any advantage from the territory they controlled. The fighters emptied the city and destroyed or burned the existing resources to minimize the resources that could be used by the Dutch for their military or logistical purposes. When Dutch troops arrived at the Sungai Penuh, they were greeted by an empty city and damaged infrastructure, making it difficult for them to establish a base or take advantage of the city (Dasiba et al., 2004).



Picture 4. Lieutenant II Muradi's Notes Dated April 25, 26, 27, 1949. Source: Ibid

Lieutenant II Muradi mentioned in his notes on April 25, 1949 at about 5 pm the Dutch entered the Sungai Penuh, and I (Lieutenant II Muradi) were still in the Sungai Penuh at this time. On the 26th, Lieutenant II Muradi noted, "Today I am still stuck on the slope. The Dutch did not make any movements. I meant to strike tonight but it didn't happen". On April 29, 1949, Lieutenant II Muradi also wrote, "until ten o'clock in the morning I was together with some members of Gati still in the surrounding Sungai Penuh (Lieutenant II Muradi, 1949c).

This record shows that on April 24, 1949, after sending 3 companies and occupying Sungai Penuh before the incident, Lieutenant II Muradi had ordered all city officials to get out of the way first to Kerinci Hilir, and important equipment such as radios were also moved to the Kerinci Hilir area which was considered safe by lieutenant II Muradi. all the city officials evacuated to Kerinci Hilir, so Lieutenant II Muradi and several members of Gati monitored the city of Sungai Penuh which had been occupied by the Dutch. lieutenant II Muradi intended to attack the Dutch but it could not be due to the inappropriate situation to carry out an attack at that time.

Building a Defense Base

Lieutenant II Muradi's strategy to oppose the Dutch included the construction of a defensive base that served as a place for

the fighters to deliberate before taking action. The defensive base built by Lieutenant II Muradi had the characteristic of moving around, but the first defensive base was established in the village of Sungai Tutung. The location of the Sungai Tutung, which was located on the edge of a hill near the forest, made it difficult for the Dutch to detect, making it difficult for them to find Lieutenant II Muradi and the other fighters (Kambaruddin, 2023).

Lieutenant II Muradi played an important role in the struggle for Indonesian independence through guerrilla operations in the Kerinci forest, covering the areas of Sungai Tutung/Pungut, Pulau Sangka/Lolo, Koto Limau Sering (Mount Selasih), and Tanjung Genting Sulak (Saidi, 2023). Lieutenant II Muradi and other fighters received vital support in the form of food from the surrounding village community, which showed solidarity and unity between the army and the residents. Lieutenant II Muradi's strategy made these areas a base of operations and a symbol of unity, combining military efforts and popular support in resisting Dutch colonialism in Kerinci.

Lieutenant II Muradi chose Sungai Tutung as the first defense center because of its strategic location, away from crowds and close to the forest, offering security and secrecy. This hidden village is ideal for defensive bases, minimizing the risk of detection by the Dutch. Residents' houses at the junction of the four Sungai Tutung

were borrowed as a defensive command center, increasing the effectiveness of military operations and demonstrating close cooperation between fighters and local communities in the face of shared threats.




Picture 5. The White House was a former defense base of Lieutenant II Muradi in Sungai Tutung during the Military Aggression II of 1949.
Source: Author Photos

A white house consisting of two floors, once made of wood, was once the headquarters of lieutenant II Muradi's guerrilla forces before the Dutch discovered and took over. The location of this house is very strategic because it is at a crossroads. During the struggle, the road around this house was still a dirt road, considering its location on the edge of the forest.

Against The Dutch In The Great Battle of Siulak Gedang

In the great battle at Siulak Gedang, Lieutenant II Muradi wrote in his Notes on May 15, 1949, a great battle occurred in Siulak Gedang from 4 am to 9 am. and on May 16, 1949 Lieutenant II Muradi mentioned that he was still in Siulak, and would meet with the rest of the group to

arrange a strategy, and on May 17, 1949 departed back to the base.



Picture 6. Lieutenant II Muradi Note dated May 15 and 16, 1949.

Source: Ibid

Before the big battle in Siulak Gedang on May 13, 1949, the people of Siulak Mukai held a banquet for GATI fighters and community leaders by slaughtering a cow. This meeting aims to urge the community to evacuate to the outskirts of the hamlet or Siulak hill as an evacuation measure. In addition, Lieutenant II Muradi and other fighters took advantage of this meeting to plan a defensive strategy against Dutch forces (Kambaruddin, 2023).

On the afternoon of May 15, 1949, Lieutenant II Muradi received information that Dutch troops were moving from Sungai TFull to Siulak via the Semurup road. Knowing this, Lieutenant II Muradi and the fighters immediately moved to Siulak from the Sungai Tutung through an alternative route because the main route was not safe. Upon arrival in Siulak, Lieutenant II Muradi held a deliberation at

the house of Pak Mari Siulak Mukai to formulate a strategy of resistance. In addition to developing strategies, they also directed people in hamlets such as Talang Tinggi, Mukai Pintu, and Sungai Langkap to evacuate to safer areas on the hillside to avoid Dutch attacks.

The Dutch invaded through three routes: Semurup Warm Water, Iron Bridge, and Pendung. As Dutch troops began to enter the area, Kamarudin, a surviving witness, was bathing in the river. He heard the sound of an explosion from a Dutch rifle and immediately rushed back to the house to leave the hamlet without lingering (Kambaruddin, 2023).

At around six o'clock in the morning, Lieutenant II Muradi and his fighters fought a fierce battle with the Dutch on the wooden bridge between Siulak Mukai and Siulak Gedang. They used an ingenious strategy by tying ropes to rice plants and pulling them to outwit the Dutch, who ran out of ammunition to shoot the rice movement. After the Dutch ammunition ran out, Lieutenant II Muradi and his troops attacked from the south of the bridge, resulting in dozens of Dutch soldiers killed and their bodies washed away in the Batang Merao river (Saidi, 2023).

Guerrillas In The Forest

After a major battle at Siulak Gedang, Lieutenant II Muradi and his troops organized guerrillas in the forest to avoid

the pursuit of the Dutch, Lieutenant II Muradi recorded the details of his guerrilla route in the forest starting on October 21, 1949. On Friday, he moved from Bukit Pendung to Pondok Surian, then Saturday to Pondok Kesik, Sunday to Sungai Kuning, Monday to Jandi Aro, Tuesday to Sungai Arau, Wednesday to Batang Tebo, Thursday to Bungo, and Friday to Himbur. From October 29 to November 5, 1949, Lieutenant II Muradi and the fighters rested in Himbur. They continued the guerrilla march from Kerinci to the South Coast, South Solok, and returned to Kerinci in Tamia on December 14, 1949, four days before the handover of sovereignty from the Dutch to Indonesia.

Handover of Sovereignty From the Netherlands to Indonesia In Kerinci

The proclamation in Kerinci was not carried out because it was blocked by the Dutch and fighting continued despite the armistice. The Round Table Conference (KMB) in The Hague on October 23-29, 1949 resulted in the handover of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) on December 27, 1949.

In West Sumatra, a meeting between Governor Nasrun and Colonel Van Erp on December 12, 1949 ensured the withdrawal of Dutch troops and the entry of Republicans to avoid a government vacuum. Alwi Sutan Marajo stepped aside, so lieutenant II Muradi and Lettu Alamsyah

took over command in Kerinci. A. Talib ordered Lieutenant II Muradi to the Sungai Tutung, but they found that the Dutch troops were still there. On December 18, 1949, Lieutenant II Muradi sent an envoy to meet A. Thalib, who then asked Lieutenant II Muradi to retreat 3.5 km from the Sungai Tutung. Lieutenant II Muradi obeyed the order and retreated, then entered the hamlet after the Dutch left the area (Ramli & Ayu, n.d.).

Ahead of the surrender of sovereignty from the Dutch in Kerinci, veterans of the Armed Forces and guerrilla forces, including Lieutenant II Muradi, formed the organization Persatuan Angkatan Republik Indonesia (PAPRI) to unite the fighters. The surrender of sovereignty in Sungai TFull was part of an order by the Commander of Division IX of the TNI Bull Brigade in Central Sumatra, who asked Lieutenant Colonel A. Thalib to go to the capital of PSK Regency to accept control of the Kerinci area from the Dutch. This process marked an important transition in the ownership and management of the territory, restoring sovereignty to the people of Kerinci as part of the Republic of Indonesia (Killerbride, 2008).

On December 19, 1949, Indonesian troops moved from the Sungai Tutung to Sungai TFull through the hamlet of Belui and were greeted with joy by the locals. On the same day, the procession of the handover of the city of Sungai Full from

the Dutch to Indonesia took place, with Van Hegendorp handing over the city to Major A. Thalib. All Dutch troops in Kerinci then departed for Padang. Similar handover ceremonies also took place in various locations in West Sumatra, where civilian and military governments were handed over from the Netherlands to Indonesia. This event marked the transition of territorial ownership and management from colonial rule to the hands of Indonesia, strengthening national sovereignty and integrity in the restoration of independence and nation building (Ramli & Ayu, n.d.).



Picture 7. Lieutenant II Muradi with Guerrilla Fighters after the Handover of the Sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia.

Source: Ibid

This picture was captured when Lieutenant II Muradi arrived at Sungai TFull in a historic moment that occurred after the handover of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia. In order to celebrate this important event, Lieutenant II Muradi and the guerrilla troops who had been fighting for a long time from within the forest, held a photo session together as a symbol of victory and

togetherness. Before the photo session, they were paraded by the people of Sungai Tutung to Sungai Penuh with joy, marking a touching journey from struggle to victory. After the official handover of sovereignty and the raising of the red and white flag in front of the Sungai TFull Grand Mosque, this group photo session not only captured the moment of victory, but also carved memories of the solidarity and high fighting spirit of the guerrilla forces and the local community.

CONCLUSION

Japan's defeat of the Allies led to the Dutch re-entry into Indonesia, which triggered strong resistance from the people. The Dutch launched two military aggressions, Military Aggression I and II, which received fierce resistance in various regions, including Kerinci. In Kerinci Regency, the resistance to Dutch troops was led by Lieutenant II Muradi, who used guerrilla warfare tactics. Lieutenant II Muradi, who was born in Koto Tuo village, Kerinci, was previously a teacher at an agricultural school in Bengkulu. During the Japanese occupation, he joined the Gyu-gun and reached the rank of sergeant major. After the Japanese left Indonesia, he was promoted to lieutenant. During the Military Aggression in 1948-1949, Lieutenant II Muradi developed various strategies to fight the Dutch, including detecting their arrival, leading the battle at Siulak Gedang, building defense bases, and guerrilla warfare in the jungle until

the handover of sovereignty from the Dutch to Indonesia in Kerinci.

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